17TH ILERA WORLD CONGRESS

7-11 September 2015, Cape Town

Human Resource Development for Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

Johann Maree, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town

johann.maree@uct.ac.za

1 Introduction

The transformation of Africa from the image of the hopeless continent to the hopeful continent is one of the major developments of the 21st century. Books with title *Africa Emerging* and an *Africa Rising Narrative* have sprung up, celebrating this phenomenon.

It is the aim of this paper to discuss the more complex reality behind this image and to spell out the implications of this for human resource development (HRD) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It does so by first setting Africa in its historical context, and proceeding from there to discuss the Africa Rising Narrative as spelled out by two authors, Horman Chitonge and Robert Rotberg.

It is found that a major omission on the part of Chitonge and Rotberg is to ignore the extent of the informal economy and informal work in Africa. The predominance of informal employment in SSA has enormous implications for developing the skilled labour force that investors in modern technology in Africa require presently and will require in future. It is investment of this kind that is going to help Africa surge ahead. In this context the paper examines the extent of informal employment in SSA. It establishes that at least a half to two-thirds of employment is informal although there is immense variation between countries.

The paper then proceeds to examine what implications this reality has for skills development in SSA. It establishes that the sub-continent faces enormous challenges in both education and training and has a long way to go to provide investors and entrepreneurs of the future with the skills they are going to require to be highly productive.

Before setting out on the exposition, it is necessary to explain that this paper constitutes the start of a five-year research project. At this stage only a literature survey has been done. Empirical research within the framework that has emerged from the literature survey has not been commenced yet. The paper therefore only presents the major findings of the literature survey completed this far.

2 Background

2.1 Pre-History and Early History

Africa is the cradle of humanity. Not only did the precursors of humankind begin to evolve in Africa about 7 million years ago, but genetic evidence has found that all human lineages in the world today can be traced back to an African ancestral population (Meredith, 2011:xiii and 189). Furthermore,

> "Scientists have identified more than twenty species of extinct humans. They have firmly established Africa as the birthplace not only of humankind but also of modern humans (*Homo sapiens)*. They have revealed how early technology, language ability and artistic endeavour all originated in Africa; and they have shown how small groups of Africans, possessing new skills, spread out from Africa in an exodus 60,000 years ago to populate the rest of the world." (Meredith, 2011:xiv)

In another book on Africa, Meredith maintains that, "Ever since the pharaohs, Africa has been coveted for its riches." (Meredith, 2014:xiii) The goldfields of West Africa stimulated

Europeans as early as the 14th century, especially after Mansa Musa, ruler of the Mali empire, paid a visit to Cairo on his way to Mecca in 1324. He generously distributed so much gold that he ruined the money market there for more than 10 years (Meredith, 2014:xiv).

Africa has had civilisations that rose and fell: the Egyptian was one of the first, if not the first, along the Mediterranean coast and Middle East. Also the allegedly wealthiest man ever in the world, and the libraries of Timbuktu. And the Zimbabwe ruins of which little is known.

2.2 Colonial and Post-Colonial Period up to 2000

Africa experienced two waves of colonisation. The first ancient and medieval colonisation commenced in the fourth century BCE when Greeks colonised North Africa. This was followed by Roman conquest in the first century BCE and finally North Africa fell to the Arabs in the seventh century CE (Wikipedia, 2015).

Although Vasco da Gama was the first known European to sail round the southern tip of Africa to India at the end of the 15th century, it was not until the middle of the 17th century that European settlement in Africa commenced in significant numbers. This was when the Dutch East India Company established a permanent settlement in 1652 in what is present-day Cape Town to provide fresh provisions for the large fleets of its vessels that sailed from Europe to the East each year (Reader, 1997:445). The European “scramble for Africa” proceeded in all seriousness and was formalised in 1884 at the Berlin Conference when Africa was carved up into British, French, Portuguese and German colonies, thereby merging more or less 10,000 African polities into just 40 colonies (Meredith, 2014:xv).

The decolonisation of Africa commenced in 1957 when Ghana regained its independence under President Kwame Nkrumah. Most African colonies regained their independence during the 1960s, but the process stretched up to 1990 when Namibia finally achieved its independence.

At first there was a sense of optimism that Africa, freed from its shackles, would soar up and prosper, but these hopes were shattered as the 20th century wore on due to corrupt and power-hungry political leaders. Dictatorships, military coups and leaders became fairly common phenomenon. Neo-patrimonialism (cronyism) accompanied by the hollowing out of the state, condemned millions of Africans to poverty while a small elite usurped what wealth was being created. This lead *The Economist* to label Africa as "The hopeless continent" at the start of the 21st century. It claimed there was a brief upsurge in the mid-1990s when democracy and liberalisation seemed to flourish, but "it was an illusion": "all the bottom places in the world league table are filled by African countries, and the gap between them and the rest of the world is widening." In its editorial it feared that "the world might just give up on the entire continent." (Economist, 2000:17)

But *The Economist* got it wrong: the brief upsurge in the mid-1990s was not an illusion. It only went into abeyance and returned in the 2000s, so much so that 11 year later The Economist trumpeted "Africa rising" on its front cover (Economist, 2011). This set off what Horman Chitonge (2015) has labelled the "Africa Rising Narrative" (ARN).

3 The Africa Rising Narrative (ARN)

In his book, *Economic Growth and Development in Africa*, Chitonge carefully assesses the ARN.

He identifies three views on the narrative:

1. Strongly positive which sees the current dynamism as an opportunity for transformation in Africa and rapid economic growth;

2. Negative and cynical, espousing that Africa won't emerge out of chaos and failure;

3. A cautious middle path that accepts the current dynamism, but is aware of its limitations and the challenges that still have to be overcome.

In the strongly positive narrative Chitonge places Steven Radelet's book, *Emerging Africa* (2010) and Robert Rotberg's *Africa Emerges* (2013). Radelet (2010:12) sees a turnaround in Africa and identifies five forces of change that are under way on the continent. They are "the spread of democratic and accountable government, prudent economic policy and management, debt cancellation, the spread of technology, and the emergence of the new generation of leaders" (Chitonge, 2015:235).

Rotberg at first appears to be firmly in strongly positive camp, but he gradually moves towards the middle path as he points out negative features that Africa still needs to address. At the outset of his book he is completely optimistic about Africa. He writes: "Africa no longer is the fabled, deeply troubled 'dark continent'. Most of its constituent countries are growing economically, delivering significant social enhancement to their inhabitants, and progressing politically. … Sub-Saharan Africa is emerging from its chrysalis of despondent, conflicted, corrupted, and ill-led decades. Tyranny and despotism are largely scourges of the past." (Rotberg, 2013:1 and 4)

But the empirical evidence Rotberg provides is far more nuanced. For instance, when he deals with governance in Africa he spells out five categories into which good and sound governance can be grouped. They are:

1. The safety and security of all the people living in a country;

2. The rule of law which entails an effective and independent judicial system and an enforceable body of law.

3. the right of citizens to participate freely, openly and fully in a democratic political process;

4. Sustainable economic opportunity for all citizens in order to achieve personal and national prosperity; and

5. Human development which entails educational opportunity up to secondary and tertiary level as well as readily available medical care in clinics and hospitals. (Rotberg, 2013:174-175)

After a thorough and careful examination a study of Sub-Saharan Africa found three kinds of governments in 2013: a clearly well-performing top 10 or 12, a "desperately ill-governed" 12 or 15, and a middle 22 to 27 countries (Rotberg 2013:176-177).

A more nuanced and explicit classification of SSA governments is supplied in Table 1 below. It classifies governments into five categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrids, authoritarian regimes and autocratic regimes.

Table 1. Classification of Sub-Saharan African Regimes in 2001 and 2011

Type of Regime	**Number of Countries**	
Year	**2001**	**2011**
Full Democracy	5	8
Flawed Democracy	9	12
Hybrid	6	2
Authoritarian	21	17
Autocratic	7	9

Note. The classification for 2011 was derived with the aid of Bratton et al (2005:17, Table 1.1) and Freedom House (2012:14-18). Bratton et al duplicated Table 2 of Diamond (2002), but included the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores for each country for 2001. Freedom House 2012 was then used to classify countries into Diamond's six categories based on the Freedom House scores allotted to each country.

Full democracies are regimes where not only free and fair elections are held regularly, but where civil and political liberties also exist along with a free press even though political leaders do not usually encourage or embrace criticisms. (Bratton et al, 2005:16)

Flawed democracies are regimes that meet minimal democratic standards by holding elections that are usually deemed free and fair, but where civil and political liberties are not secure, especially between elections (Bratton et al, 2005:16).

Authoritarian governments use the trappings of formal democratic institutions such as multiparty elections in order to mask the reality of authoritarian domination (Diamond, 2002:24).

The autocratic regimes are ones where the governments do not even make any pretence at being democratic. They either hold sham elections or come to power through heredity, military coups or armed insurgency (Bratton et al, 2005:18).

Governments that have elements of both democratic and authoritarian practises and are difficult to place, are labelled as hybrid.

In summary, Table 1 shows that out of the 48 regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa the number of countries classified as democratic increased from 14 to 20 from 2001 to 2011while the number of authoritarian regimes decreased slightly from 28 to 26 over the same period. Although this is an improvement, it is not the sea-change that the ARN proclaims.

Both Rotberg and the Bratton-Freedom-House derived figures show that democratisation has been on the rise in Africa, but there are still a fairly substantial proportion of authoritarian and autocratic states in SSA.

In line with this, Chitonge maintains that evidence on both the positive and negative sides of the ARN has not been adequately substantiated and provides evidence of both positive and negative trends in SSA. His evidence is mainly economic.

Chitonge shows that gross domestic product (GDP) grew steadily at around 4% to 6% per annum from 2000 to 2007, then declined in 2008 and 2009, but recovered to the 5% to 6% level from 2010 onwards (pp.240-41)

He points out that there are growth disparities between countries, but “the majority of countries experienced positive growth, with some – such as Nigeria, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Angola – recording an annual average GDP growth rate of over 7 per cent over the 2000-2010 period.” (p.240)

Chitonge (2015:241) also shows “a remarkable reduction in the debt burden around 2005-6, as well as a substantial increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) around 2008-2009.”

However, there is also a negative side: He shows that, from 1980 onwards there has been little progress on key issues such as national savings, fixed capital formation and agricultural production.

Even more worrying, says Chitonge (2015:245), is the lack of transformation of the economies of most African countries. The manufacturing sector “accounts for only a tiny section of the exports of most African countries” while “the larger share of export earnings for most countries in SSA still comes from agriculture, where productivity is actually declining.”

Where there is not an over-reliance on agriculture, there is an over-reliance on the export of oil, or minerals and metals such as diamonds, gold, copper and iron ore, i.e. raw materials.

For instance, oil accounts for 87% of Nigeria's exports and 91.3% of Sudan's while copper for over 70% of Zambia's exports (Chitonge, 2015:245).

Chitonge concludes that "growth seems to be concentrated within the commodity and services sectors, with little or no linkage to the rest of the economy – thereby creating two *Africas*: the new and rising, and the old and stagnant. And this is one of the reasons why there has been little effect on poverty and inequality in most African countries" (Chitonge, 2015:245).

What Chitonge's analysis shows is that most African countries, especially those that depend on a single source of wealth, have not diversified their economies. They have not succeeded in beneficiating the raw materials they export by developing processing and productive capacities, i.e. by developing a manufacturing sector. Instead they import the finished products from the countries to which they export the raw material, particularly to and from China.

Rotberg (2013) demonstrates this very well. He writes: "Sub-Saharan Africa's economic development prospects almost entirely depend on continued Chinese demand" (Rotberg, 2013:151). About 70% of Africa's oil is exported to China and about 75% of all Chinese investment in Africa goes into infrastructural construction of roads, railways, bridges and harbours that facilitate the extraction of raw materials out of Africa, but also new dams and hydroelectric installations (Rotberg, 2013:155 & 157). This seems to go hand in hand with Chinese military aid to Africa. Shin has suggested that China's strategy is to "strengthen stability in African countries that sell or have a potential to sell China significant quantities of raw materials" (Shin, 2008, as cited in Rotberg, 2013:160). It is certainly the case that China has been willing to supply military hardware to buttress existing governments however autocratic or dubious they are (Rotberg, 2013:160).

In return China sells very inexpensive consumer goods in Africa that have undermined many enterprises in Africa. According to Rotberg (2013:164), “In Northern Nigeria, the landed price of inexpensive cloth and garments imported from China compelled the closure of hundreds of textile factories that could not price their own products low enough to compete successfully. Thousands of Nigerian jobs were lost.” The same happened in Ghana and southern African countries including South Africa.

Chinese infrastructural investment in Africa has a negative side to it: “China insists on using Chinese labourers, not just Chinese foremen or managers” (Rotberg, 2013:162). Where they do use local labourers, it is generally to do unskilled work. What is more, “Chinese corporate CEOs are often willing to cut corners, ignore official safety regulations, pay low wages, and generally push their indigenous workers hard.” This, according to Rotberg, is because Chinese managers in Africa “care overwhelmingly for productivity achievements and over-fulfilling tonnage or product quotas” (Rotberg, 2013:163).

Although Rotberg and Chitonge’s analysis is extensive, they and many other writers on SSA ignore a serious drawback on the subcontinent, and that is the existence of a large informal sector and extensive informal employment.

4 Informal Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa

A very important feature of Sub-Saharan Africa is the extent of the informal sector. The informal sector is distinguished by the fact that none of its economic activity is registered with the state or any other regulatory institution. They therefore fall outside the surveillance of the state and these institutions. Hence they can bypass laws regulating employment and working conditions. Businesses in the informal sector are therefore not compelled to pay taxes nor to abide by any regulations regarding working conditions, hours of work, or minimum wages.

It has become increasingly common to draw a distinction between working in the informal sector and being an informal employee in the formal sector. This is because much of the employment in the formal sector has become insecure giving rise to what has been called vulnerable or precarious workers. Guy Standing has gone as far as calling such workers the precariat. What all informal workers lack is social security. Neither the state nor employers provide them with social security even though they are working. The distinction between working in the informal sector and being an informal employee in the formal sector will be maintained in this paper wherever it is necessary to do so.

Commencing with working in the informal sector, a major problem is that its measurement in many countries in Africa is inaccurate and figures are often unreliable. There are accounts claiming that it constitutes a very high proportion of total employment throughout Africa with few exceptions. For instance, Skinner (2002:15) presents a table that informal employment constitutes 90% of total employment including agriculture in Africa. Johanson and Adams (2004:3) state that, "in a typical African country (excluding South Africa and Mauritius), as much as 85% of total employment is engaged in the informal economy, with most of this in smallholder agriculture." The reality is that it ranges quite extensively from country to country and is lower than these figures sugges. With regards to the proportion of the labour force working in the informal sector, Palmer presents a table of the informal sector contribution to urban employment in 17 African countries in 2000. It shows that informal employment as a proportion of total urban employment in 5 countries ranged from 70 to 85 percent, 8 in the 30 to 69 percent and 4 in the 15 to 29 percent range. The 5 countries where informal sector workers as a percentage of total urban employment was above 70% are Uganda (84%), Zambia (81%), Ghana (79%), Gambia (72%) and Mali (71%). The 4 countries where it was below 30% are South Africa (17%), Botswana (19%), Mauritius

(24%) and Morocco (28%). The average for the 17 countries is 52% (Palmer, 2004:36, Table 2).

In addition, the majority of informal workers are self-employed. According to WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing), there were twice as many workers in informal self-employment as in informal wage employment in the non-agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 2004-2010 (Vanek et al, 2014:11, Table 4).

Two problems with these figures are, firstly, that they are not reliable, and secondly, they exclude the agricultural sector. As regards the lack of reliability of the figures, an ILO study came up with markedly different figures to the ones cited above for the proportion of employment in the informal sector of the economy for some of the countries. For Uganda, it puts the proportion of employment in the informal sector at 60% instead of the figure of 84% by Palmer, for Zambia 65%instead of 81%, for Mauritius 9% instead of 24%. However, for Mali (71%) it comes up with exactly the same figure (ILO, 2013:10, Table 2.1).

The exclusion of the agricultural sector is apparently done for measurement and methodological reasons (Charmes, 2005:218). WIEGO has been bold enough to provide figures for informal employment in agriculture. It finds that for Sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural informal self-employment as a proportion of total agricultural employment was 54% over the period 2004- 2010, much the same as the proportion of informal employment in the non-agricultural sector's total employment in the region (Vanek et al, 2014:10, Tables 2 & 3).

To gain a full picture of informal employment it is necessary to include the informally employed workers in the formal sector of an economy. This inevitably pushes up the rate of informal employment. An ILO study has managed to collect the figures for 8 African countries. For these 8 countries informal employment in the formal sector ranged from11% to

25% of total employment with an average figure of 17%. It is interesting to compare the final figures of the ILO study for the same countries covered by Palmer. For Mali it pushes up informal employment by 11% to 82%, South Africa by 15% to 33% and Zambia up by 12% to 70% of total employment. (ILO, 2013:10, Table 2.1) Finally, according to WIEGO (2015), total informal employment, including both employment in the informal economy and informal employment in the formal economy, in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2004-2010 averaged 66%. It thus seems a reasonable conclusion that more than half of the labour force in Sub-Saharan Africa, probably around two-thirds, are in informal employment, and there are large differences between countries.

5 Human Resource Development (HRD) in SSA

By human resource development is meant providing people with sufficient knowledge and skills to render then employable or to engage in sustainable self-employment. It has two components: education and training. Training includes both theoretical and practical components. By so doing it provides apprentices with both the knowledge and dexterity to be able to perform the tasks for which they are employed.

5.1 Education in SSA

Education is the foundation on which technical and vocational training is built. A recent World Bank Study (World Bank, 2012) contains considerable useful and up-to-date information about the level of education in SSA. It finds that, over the past 20 years, educational levels have risen sharply across the sub-continent. Table 2 indicates what had been achieved by 2009.

However, compared to what Europe and Central Asia (E&CA) have achieved, SSA still has a long way to go. Whereas in E&CA there was a gross enrolment ratio of 91%at upper secondary school level in 2009, in SSA it was only 21%. Tertiary education has also increased rapidly in SSA even though only 5% proceeded to tertiary education in 2009 (World Bank, 2012:3, Figure 0.1).

Table 2. Education Coverage in Low-Income Countries, by World Region, ca. 2009

	Median GDP per capita (Current US$)	*Level of Education: Pre-Primary GER (%)*	*Primary GIR (%)*	*Primary PCR (%)*	*Lower Secondary GER (%)*	*Upper Secondary GER (%)*	*Higher (Students per 100,000 pop.)*
Sub-Saharan Africa	508	15	119	63	45	21	450
Europe and Central Asia	1,982	33	100	100	97	91	3,072

Source: World Bank, 2012:Table 1.1
Note: GER = gross enrolment ratio, GIR = gross intake rate, PCR = primary completion rate, GDP = gross domestic product.

The low retention rate of schools in Africa indicates that there is a high drop-out rate. The high drop-out rate "could be an indication that the type and quality of schooling provided is inadequate or does not meet the expectations and needs of students and parents" (World Bank, 2012:3). The drop-out rates of children who are poor or live in rural areas are among the highest. This is borne out by the difference in completion rates in lower and upper secondary education between low-income SSA countries and middle-income countries as shown in Table 3.

Another matter of great concern is that even those children who are at school are not receiving an education of sufficient quality. Combined test scores from three international learning assessment programmes have found that "Primary school students in low-income Sub-Saharan African countries have, on average, learned less than half of what is expected of them." (World Bank, 2012:6) As is to be expected, children from richer countries perform better than the average, while children from poorer countries perform worse. These findings have prompted the World Bank to say that achieving an acceptable level of education is perhaps an even greater challenge than increasing the number of children being educated (World Bank, 2012:1).

Table 3. Secondary Education Coverage in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries, ca. 2009

	Lower secondary		*Upper secondary*	
	GIR (%)	*CR (%)*	*GIR (%)*	*CR (%)*
Low-income countries				
Congo, Rep.	52	44	21	19
Eritrea	44	34	30	12
Mozambique	35	20	10	7
Niger	27	10	4	3
Rwanda	29	22	17	13
Middle-income countries				
Botswana	95	88	56	54
Cape Verde	96	81	78	52
Gabon	74	48	43	25
Mauritius	82	83	81	44
South Africa	82	86	71	43
Sub-Saharan African average	52	37	25	19

Source: World Bank, 2012:26, Table 1.2. The Table is the *a*uthors' construction from 2006–10 UIS Data Centre. All data are from 2005 or later.
Note: GIR and CR refer, respectively, to the Gross Intake Ratio and the Completion Rate.

This raises the question of what needs to be done to improve learning. The World Bank study found that per student spending seems to bear little relationship to learning, but other factors do matter. What is found to be "most important" is that "teachers must be present at work and make the best use of their skills and the resources available to them. … Current high rates of teacher absenteeism represent a serious problem that calls upon governments and donors to place greater emphasis on accountability" (World Bank, 2012:8).

In spite of the low standard of education, it is pleasing that empirical evidence suggests that education of girls in particular, is correlated “with significant health and social benefits” (World Bank, 2012:8)

On the other hand it is extremely disappointing that the World Bank study found that “the rise in educational attainment of the labour force in the region appears to have had little impact on average labour productivity. The weighted average labour productivity for Sub-Saharan Africa, across all sectors, has remained at practically the same level since 1985. At the same time, the average level of schooling has been increasing across the region.” The World Bank surmises that the lack of impact of rising education on labour productivity could be due to the poor use of human capital (World Bank, 2012:10).

By contrast, the rapid increase in tertiary education in Sub-Saharan African countries has left many graduates unemployed. This has been attributed to a mismatch between the skills provided by tertiary education and the skills required in the economy, especially in low-income SSA countries.

> “Most of these countries are dualistic economies with small, slow-growing formal or modern sectors—traditionally the employer of first resort among highly skilled workers. Currently, almost 80 percent of workers who attended higher education are working in the modern sector, but young workers with similar educational profiles are now less likely to find formal sector jobs than in the past.” (World Bank, 2012:10)

It is also contended by the World Bank study that the concentration on expanding tertiary education rapidly in SSA has led to a decline in standards . It postulates that “if most recent graduates cannot find gainful employment or jobs that match their skills, it may be an indication that the education system needs some form of rebalancing such as shifting its emphasis on quantity to an emphasis on quality.” (World Bank, 2012:10)

Another solution that it puts forward is the "alignment of higher education programs with employers' needs" (World Bank, 2012:11). While this is very sound advice, there is a deeper structural problem in the economies of many SSA countries, which is the over-reliance on agriculture and mining, and the underdevelopment of its manufacturing and related industries such as information and communication technology. It is these industries that also need to expand and grow in order to absorb new graduates.

5.2 Vocational Education and Training in Sub-Saharan Africa

At the other end of the spectrum to the employment of graduates is the employment of workers with low levels of education. This usually takes place in the informal sector. Since a majority of people are working informally in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to know what vocational and technical education and training they are receiving. The aim is to establish how adequate their education and training is to qualify them to move into the formal sector where productivity and pay are higher.

The most common form of vocational training in the informal economy of Sub-Saharan Africa is traditional apprenticeship. According to Johanson and Adams (2004:129) "traditional apprenticeship training is responsible for more skills development than the offerings of all other training providers combined." It consists of an oral or written agreement between the parents of an apprentice and a "master". The apprentice then learns how to perform the tasks from the master. It is a process of learning by watching and doing: "Training consists primarily of observing and imitating the master." (Johanson and Adams, 2004:131) There is no theoretical training involved. Although this form of apprenticeship is practised right across SSA, it is most common in West Africa. "In Ghana, 80-90 percent of all basic skills training comes from traditional or informal apprenticeship, compared with 5 to

10 percent from public training institutions and 10-15 percent from nongovernment for-profit and non-profit training providers.” (Johanson and Adams, 2004:129)

Traditional apprenticeship is self-financing. The parents pay for the training to commence, but some of the payment may come through the value of the work the apprentice is delivering, or taken off the pay of the apprentice. It is however gender-biased with mostly boys being apprenticed. It also screens out the poorest families (Johanson and Adams, 2004:132).

There are advantages and disadvantages to this form of human resource development. Advantages are that it is an easy and accessible way for a youth to enter the labour market and that it does not require government financial support or subsidies. Being apprenticed in the workplace the youth gains experience which makes it easier to find employment at the end of the apprenticeship period. Often the apprentice stays on at the enterprise to the benefit of both the youth and the enterprise (Johanson and Adams, 2004:133-134).

The disadvantages are that the level of skill acquired is usually low as the training is “relatively unsophisticated”, technology in use is dated, and there is no standardisation or certification to ensure that a certain level of competence has been achieved (Johanson and Adams, 2004:132-135). This form of training would not normally qualify the apprentice to enter the formal economy where higher levels of theory and knowledge are usually required and where productivity and remuneration are higher.

Apprenticeships by watching and doing in informal enterprises, although widespread and not without benefits, do not prepare workers to enter the formal economy. It is therefore necessary for other forms of human resource development to be on offer, not only in the informal labour market, but also in the formal market.

Johanson and Adams point to three additional institutional bases that can and do advance TVET in SSA. They are public training by the state, non-governmental training, and formal-sector enterprises. They also stress the importance of obtaining the finances, or resource mobilisation, to promote training. These are each briefly discussed.

Although vocational training by states is important, their institutions continue to fall short in terms of their relevance, effectiveness, their costs and efficiency, according to Johanson and Adams (2004:4). State institutions have been found to be most effective where stakeholders have been given authority for developing training markets and allocating resources. They conclude that state-sponsored training works best when delivered in partnership with other providers to meet market needs and diversify financing (Johanson and Adams, 2004:5).

The nongovernment training sector is very diverse and ranges from NGOs to for-profit trainers. They have been found to play an important role in the supply of skills for SSA. In many cases, their provision of training outshines the supply from pubic sources. Often a lack of resources restrains them and public financing could help them become more effective (Johanson and Adams, 2004:6)

"Resource mobilization," maintain Johanson and Adams (2004:9) "must be an integral part of national training policy, in view of limitations on public financing." Mobilisation of additional resources takes place through payroll levies. In 2004 there were 12 countries in SSA raising payroll levies, but problems were experienced. These included noncompliance among employers, particularly smaller enterprises, and diversion of levy money for other uses as well as misuse of funds. Another way additional resources are mobilised is by means of tuition and other fees paid by enterprise or trainees and their families (Johanson and Adams, 2004:9).

The allocation of funds is important in order to enable the poor to gain access to training as well as to help training systems become more demand-oriented and efficient. In 2004 there were 21 countries in SSA with training funds, managing resources from government budgets, training levies in 12 of the countries, and donors. Effective training funds were found to have transparent rules of allocation and good governance with employer and worker representation (Johanson and Adams, 2004:10).

Finally, training in formal sector enterprises play an important role in the provision of training. In combination with nongovernment training institutions, more skills development has taken place than in state-sponsored training institutions. What is more, 'enterprise-based training is largely self-financing, self-regulating, and cost-effective. It occurs without much government help." (Johanson and Adams, 2004:7) As is common the world over, larger enterprises train more than smaller enterprises. There can be considerable variation between them. Larger enterprises with more than 150 employees, have rates of formal training that are 10 to 20 times higher than small enterprises with 10 or fewer workers (Johanson and Adams, 2004:7).

Having established the importance of formal sector enterprise training in skills development, it is appropriate to consider the role human resource management in the provision of skills development.

5.3 The Role of Human Resource Management (HRM) in the provision of technical and vocational education and training

The role of HRM in formal companies, especially, large and multi-national corporations (MNCs), in the provision of technical and vocational education and training is of crucial importance in SSA.

There are many instances of high quality and innovative management in SSA in which strategic HRM most probably played a crucial role. As Kamoche and his co-authors (2012:2827) have pointed out, there have been impressive achievements of innovative and efficient management on the African continent.

Studies of the provision of vocational education and training in the informal sector of SSA referred to in this paper, have found that employers play a key role in the provision of training of new entrants into the labour market. In fact, they maintain that apprenticeship under the tutelage of a “master” is the most general way in which skills are acquired in Africa.

Yet, in the literature that I have thus far explored on HRM in Africa, there is very little emphasis placed on the role that human resource managers play in the provision of technical and vocational education and training in SSA. Instead, there is an emphasis on the transfer of skills and knowledge by expatriates to locals in MNCs (Kamoche et al, 2012:2829). However, this transfer of skill only applies at the managerial level, not at the worker level where the overwhelming bulk of local labour is employed. There is also an emphasis on the need for MNCs to be sensitive to, and respectful of, the cultures and customs of Africa, to adopt more inclusive and communal approaches (Kamoche et al, 2012:2830-2831). While this is important and would improve HRM practices, it does not address the problem of providing an adequately skilled labour force, especially one that requires scientific and technical knowledge. For instance, in none of the following recent literature edited or written by Kamoche is there a discussion on apprenticeship and internship in order to education and train artisans:Kamoche et al, 2004; Kamoche, 2011; and Kamoche et al, 2012. Yet these are crucial and the bedrock on which highly productive mining, manufacturing, and related industries such as transport, construction, electricity and water supplies are built. This is a serious omission and neglect on the part of many researchers and writers on HRM in SSA.

6. Conclusion

This paper has found that the Africa Rising Narrative (ARN) has to be qualified. As Chitonge (2015:245) concluded, two Africas exist side by side: “the new and rising, and the old and stagnant.” Part of “the old and stagnant” is the informal economy and informal employment. The main form of training for the informally employed is traditional apprenticeship whereby the apprentice learns by watching the “master” and copying what he does. As Johanson and Adams (2004:131) summarise it: “Training consists primarily of observing and imitating the master.” There is no theoretical training, standardisation, quality control or certification. This is where the state and employers in the formal sector have to step in and play a major role, assisted by NGOs, for-profit organisation and international agencies. Trade unions can also play an important role by encouraging and facilitating the training of its members as well as non-members as it is in their interest to do so.

For Sub-Saharan Africa to rise and keep on rising it is essential that its governments, formal employers and investors pay urgent attention to lifting the quality and quantity of education and training on the sub-continent.

Bibliography

Bratton M, Mattes R, and Gyimah-Boadi E. Eds. 2005. *Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Charmes, Jacques. 2005. Rethinking Africa's Ordinary Economies. The informal/formal and the farm/non-farm divides in Beveridge et al. *Re-integrating Education, Skills and Work in Africa: Towards informal or knowledge economies? Towards autonomy or dependency in development?* Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.

Chitonge, Horman. 2015. *Economic Growth and Development in Africa: Understanding trends and prospects*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Diamond L. 2002. Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 13, 2, 21-35.

Economist, The. 2000. The hopeless continent. May 13-19. Editorial "Hopeless Africa"; Article "Africa: The heart of the matter", 17 & 23-25.

Freedom House. 2012. Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and Their Global Repercussions. www.freedomhouse.org

ILO (International Labour Office). 2013. *Women and men in the informal economy*: *A statistical picture. Second Edition.* Geneva: ILO.

Johanson, Richard, and Avril Adams. 2004. *Skills Development in Sub-Saharan* Africa, Washington DC: World Bank.

Kamoche, Ken, Amon Chizema, Kamel Mellahi and Aloysius Newenham-Kahindi. 2012. New directions in the management of human resources in Africa. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management,* 23, 14, July, 2825-2834.

Kamoche, Ken. 2011. Contemporary development in the management of human resources in Africa. *Journal of World Business*, 46, 1, January, 1-4.

Kamoche, Ken, Yaw debrah, Frank Horwitz and Gerry Nkombo Muuka, eds. 2004. *Managing Human Resources in Africa*. London: Routledge.

Mahajan, Vijay. 2009. *Africa Rising: How 900 Million African Consumers Offer More than You Think*. New Jersey: Wharton School Publishing.

Meredith, Martin. 2011. *Born in Africa*. London: Simon & Schuster; & Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.

Meredith, Martin. 2014. *The Fortunes of Africa: A 5,000-Year History of Wealth, Greed and Endeavour*. London: Simon & Schuster; & Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.

Palmer, Robert. 2004. The informal economy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unresolved issues of concept, character and measurement. Occasional Papers No.98, Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh University.

Radelet, Steven. 2010. *Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Reader, John. 1997. *Africa: A Biography of the Continent*. London: Penguin Books.

Rotberg, Robert. 2013. *Africa Emerges*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Skinner, Caroline. 2002. Understanding Formal and Informal Economy Labour Market Dynamics: A Conceptual and Statistical Review with Reference to South Africa. Research Report No.50, University of Natal, Durban.

Vanek, Joann, Martha Chen, Françoise Carré, James Heintz and Ralf Hussmanns. 2014. Statistics on the Informal Economy: Definitions, Regional Estimates & Challenges. WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing) Working Paper (Statistics) no.2, April.

WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing). 2015. Informal Employment Statistical Picture. http://wiego.org/informal-economy/statistical-picture Accessed 13 August 2015.

Wikipedia, 2015. Colonisation of Africa. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonisation_of_Africa accessed 20 August.

World Bank. 2012. *Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis* by Majgaard, Kirsten, and Alain Mingat. Washington DC: World Bank.